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UNCERTAIN FISCAL CONSOLIDATIONS*
Huixin Bi, Eric M. Leeper and Campbell Leith
This article explores the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal consolidations whose timing and
composition – either tax–or spending– based – are uncertain. We find that the composition of the
fiscal consolidation, its duration, the monetary policy stance, the level of government debt, and
expectations over the likelihood and composition of fiscal consolidations all matter in determining
the extent to which a given consolidation is expansionary or successful in stabilising government
debt. We argue that the conditions that could render fiscal consolidation efforts expansionary are
unlikely to apply in the current economic environment.
The financial crisis of 2007–9 left advanced economies with average levels of gross
government debt breaching 100% of gross domestic product (GDP) for the first time
since the aftermath of World War II, as IMF (2011) reports. The IMF now expects most
governments in those economies, except for Japan and the US, to begin consolidation
efforts by 2012. Politicians in some countries, most notably the UK, argue that fiscal
consolidations will ultimately enhance growth but they cite the need to avoid rising debt
costs as a keymotivation in undertaking fiscal consolidations.Over themedium term, the
dominant fiscal trend in advanced economies is a return to a position of fiscal
sustainability, particularly when prompted to do so under financial market pressure.
Textbook Keynesian analysis suggests that fiscal consolidations inevitably contract
aggregate demand, reducing output and consumption. Neoclassical and New Keyne-
sian models, grounded in intertemporal consumption smoothing behaviour, also tend
to suggest that temporary public expenditure cuts and distortionary tax increases
reduce output, although with some crowding in of private sector consumption in the
case of spending cuts.1 Giavazzi and Pagano’s (1990) analysis of fiscal consolidations in
Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s, however, suggests that such fiscal actions could be
expansionary, as output growth actually accelerated after these particular fiscal
tightenings. Briotti’s (2005) survey of empirical work considers a wider set of countries
over a wider time period and also finds some evidence that fiscal consolidations can be
expansionary. The persistence and composition of the consolidation often matter, with
government spending cuts being thought to be pro-growth relative to tax increases.2
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With standard theory unable to produce expansionary consolidations, emphasis has
shifted to the role of expectations. Bertola and Drazen (1993) develop a model in
which government spending is inherently unsustainable but the government period-
ically cuts spending to make policy sustainable. These consolidations may occur at a
low threshold, but if not, they will definitely occur at a second, higher threshold. A
worsening fiscal position raises the probability of soon entering a period of fiscal
correction and, therefore, can lead to an expansion.3 While Bertola and Drazen (1993)
is often cited as an example of the importance of expectations when considering the
impact of fiscal policy, it cannot address questions relating to the composition of
consolidations, which the empirical literature often finds important. Our analysis
begins by adding distorting taxes to Bertola and Drazen’s (1993) model to explore
whether a standard model, augmented with empirically motivated uncertainty over the
timing and composition of fiscal consolidation, can plausibly explain the existence of
the expansionary fiscal consolidations sometimes found in the empirical literature.4
Following this simple example, we develop a non-linear dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model, in which fiscal consolidations may occur with an increasing
probability as governmentdebt levels rise but the exact timing is uncertain. It is consistent
with the empirical observation that sizeable consolidations can take place at low and high
debt levels. We also introduce uncertainty over the composition of the fiscal consolida-
tion, either tax based or spending based, building on the data set by Alesina and Ardagna
(2010). We find that the nature of fiscal consolidation, its duration, expectations over its
likelihood and composition, themonetary policy stance and the level of governmentdebt
all matter in determining the extent to which a given consolidation is expansionary and/
or successful in stabilising government debt. When debt levels are high, the inflationary
consequences of alternative fiscal instruments, conditional on the stance of monetary
policy, are particularly important in determining the impact of alternative forms of fiscal
consolidation. For example, when economic agents anticipate tax increases in an
imminent fiscal consolidation package, they will suffer the ill-effects of distortionary
taxation, including higher inflation and, when monetary policy is active, higher debt
service costs, even if the realised consolidation is ultimately spending based. As a result,
the resolutionof theuncertainty associatedwith the composition or the timing canhave a
significant impact on thenature of themarginal economic response to the consolidation.
Such non-linear interactions among debt levels, the monetary policy stance, the
compositions of consolidations and the expectations about the nature of consolida-
tions are unlikely to be controlled for by adding individual variables to linear
regressions or by sorting samples conditional on a single variable. This may explain why
the empirical literature does not always fully agree on the relative importance of
different factors in determining whether or not a consolidation is expansionary and/or
3 Similarly, Sutherland (1997) suggests that there will be non-linearities in the economic impact of fiscal
policy when debt levels affect the timing of fiscal consolidations in an overlapping generations economy.
Alesina andPerotti (1997) also argue that the response to changes in tax ratesmay be quite different depending
on the extent and nature of union wage bargaining.
4 Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) and Born and Pfeifer (2011) consider fiscal policy uncertainty in the
form of time-varying shock variances in fiscal policy rules. Our study differs from this line of work in that we
focus on uncertainty about the systematic parts of fiscal rules to study the composition and timing of large-
scale state-dependent fiscal consolidations.
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successful. In many cases, one study finds a conditioning variable to be significant,
while another study does not.5
The next Section discusses empirical evidence in Alesina and Ardagna (2010), who
analyse large-scale fiscal consolidations within OECD countries between 1970 and
2007. Section 2 lays out a simple neoclassical model where uncertainty over the timing
and the composition of fiscal consolidations can be expansionary. Section 3 outlines
the richer New Keynesian model and the range of state-dependent fiscal consolidations
that may occur. Section 4 describes the fiscal limit distribution that determines the
state-dependent probability of observing a fiscal consolidation and Section 5 describes
the calibration and solution for the non-linear model. Sections 6 and 7 present the
model’s implications for a wide range of fiscal consolidations. Section 8 concludes.
1. Fiscal Consolidations Data
Alesina and Ardagna (2010) (henceforth AA) analyse episodes of fiscal stimulus (rise
in deficit/fall in surplus) and consolidation (fall in deficit/rise in surplus) of more
than 1.5% of GDP, where the data are cyclically adjusted. They classify an episode as
‘expansionary’ if GDP growth in the 2 years following the stimulus/consolidation is
greater than the 75th percentile of the empirical density in all episodes. They also
define a ‘successful’ fiscal consolidation as one that reduces the debt-GDP ratio by
4.5% 3 years later. Based on a sample of developed economies between 1970 and 2007,
there are 107 episodes of fiscal consolidation, 15.1% of the observations.
We follow AA in computing the average change in key fiscal variables in the 2 years
following a fiscal consolidation relative to the 2 years prior to the adjustment.6 Table 1
details the average change in fiscal variables under both types of consolidation, where
all variables are measured relative to output. It reveals some striking differences
between ‘expansionary’ and ‘contractionary’ consolidations that meet AA’s definitions.
‘Expansionary’ consolidations feature a statistically significant fall in government
spending of 2.19% of GDP and a statistically insignificant rise in tax revenues of 0.35%
and fall in transfers of 0.58% of GDP. In contrast, contractionary consolidations entail
a fall in government spending of only 0.8% and rises in tax revenues of 1.11% and in
transfers of 0.47%, all of which are statistically significant.
The ‘expansionary’ fiscal consolidations appear to be driven by spending cuts with no
significant increases in aggregate tax revenues, while the ‘contractionary’ episodes are
far more heavily dependent on increases in taxation. AA also observe that one out of
four fiscal consolidations are spending based and that, out of 107 fiscal consolidations,
65 last for 1 year, 13 last 2 years, four last 3 years and one lasts for 4 years. We use these
observations to calibrate both the consolidation duration and the relative frequency of
spending-based and tax-based consolidations in the numerical simulations below.
5 For example, Lambertini and Tavares (2005) find that accompanying exchange rate devaluations help
ensure fiscal consolidations are successful but Ardagna (2004) does not; while Alesina and Ardagna (2010)
find that the composition of consolidations affects both how expansionary and successful a consolidation is,
Ardagna (2004) argues that composition does not matter for success.
6 Our numbers differ slightly from those in AA as we exclude consolidations that do not have observations
either before or after the episode, because we wish to assess the statistical significance of the changes in fiscal
variables over the course of a consolidation episode.
© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
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2. Simple Model of Fiscal Consolidation
In this Section, we use a small, open economy to highlight the role that expectations
may play in determining whether a fiscal consolidation is expansionary. We augment
Bertola and Drazen’s (1993) model with distortionary taxation. The small, open
economy assumption allows us to generate analytical results in an endowment economy
in which households still face meaningful consumption/saving decisions. Uncertainty
over both the composition and the timing of fiscal consolidations generates expectation
effects that have implications for the existence of expansionary consolidations.
A representative household chooses consumption, ct , and financial assets, at , to
maximise utility
Et
X1
s¼ 0
bsðg0ctþs  g1c2tþsÞ ð1Þ
Table 1
Expansionary and Contractionary Fiscal Consolidations in AA
Data
Expansionary Contractionary
Debt
4:93* 5:42*
(1.69) (1.41)
Change in debt 0.54 2:22*
(1.21) (0.53)
Total deficit 3:05* 1:56*
(0.52) (0.33)
Primary deficit 2:54* 1:91*
(0.58) (0.31)
Primary expenditures 2:19* 0:80*
(0.65) (0.34)
Transfers 0.58 0:47*
(0.41) (0.17)
Govt wage expenditures 0:40* 0:40*
(0.17) (0.13)
Govt non-wage expenditures 0.13 0.14
(0.12) (0.08)
Subsidies 0:32* 0:16*
(0.11) (0.05)
Govt investment 0:76* 0:83*
(0.25) (0.15)
Total rev 0.35 1:11*
(0.42) (0.24)
Income tax 0.16 0.27
(0.33) (0.17)
Business tax 0:81* 0:39*
(0.36) (0.14)
Indirect tax 0.01 0:27*
(0.15) (0.12)
Social security contributions 0.06 0.14
(0.22) (0.13)
Notes. *Statistical significance at the 5% level, all variables are the average
changes in the variable relative to GDP in the 2 years preceding and
following a fiscal consolidation. The standard errors are in brackets.
© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
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s.t. bat ¼ at1 þ y½1 st  wðstÞ2  ct ; ð2Þ
where y is the household’s endowment income and utility parameters g0, g1 [ 0 are
assumed to be consistent with a positive but declining marginal utility of
consumption over the relevant range. The holdings of financial assets at the start
of period, at1, earn a world interest rate of 1/b. st is the tax rate on endowment
income, which carries deadweight losses of ywðstÞ2. Deadweight losses can be
motivated by tax avoidance activities, but more generally, they capture the costs of
distortionary taxation in economies with a more sophisticated supply side.7 The
household’s intertemporal budget constraint, after imposing its transversality
condition, is
X1
s¼ 0
bsEt ctþs ¼ at1 þ Et
X1
s¼0
bsy½1 stþs  wðstþsÞ2: ð3Þ
The household’s first-order condition delivers pure consumption smoothing
ct ¼ Et ctþs: ð4Þ
Only surprises in the either the composition or the timing of fiscal consolidations
induce jumps in consumption, while anticipated cuts in government spending and/or
tax rises affect consumption only at the time when they are news.
The government’s flow budget constraint is
bbt ¼ bt1  yst þ gt ; ð5Þ
implying the intertemporal condition
bt1 ¼ Et
X1
s¼ 0
bsystþs  Et
X1
s¼ 0
bsgtþs: ð6Þ
Imposing equilibrium – (4) and (6) – the household’s intertemporal budget
constraint implies
ct
1 b ¼ ðat1  bt1Þ þ Et
X1
s¼ 0
bsy½1 wðstþsÞ2  Et
X1
s¼ 0
bsgtþs; ð7Þ
where at1  bt1 are the net foreign assets held by households. At time t, the right
hand side of (7) is predetermined or exogenous to the household, so this expression
maps alternative compositions and timings of fiscal consolidations into equilibrium
consumption.
Assume that the initial levels of government spending, g 0, and tax rates, s0, are
insufficient to ensure government solvency. Then debt is increasing and government
spending or taxes must change in the future. After n periods, debt reaches a level
btþn1, found by accumulating the government’s flow budget constraint forwards n
periods.
7 In the New Keynesian DSGE model in Section 3, there are two distortions: the standard mechanism of
taxes distorting labour supply decisions and sticky prices, which create additional distortions caused by the
inflationary consequences of changes in distortionary taxation.
© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
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btþn1 ¼ bnbt1  bn
Xn1
s¼0
bsys0 þ bn
Xn1
s¼0
bsg 0: ð8Þ
We now consider two types of uncertainty: uncertainty in the timing of the fiscal
consolidation and uncertainty in its composition.
2.1. The Timing of Consolidations
The timing of fiscal consolidation can affect the likelihood of an expansionary
consolidation only through the non-linear deadweight losses associated with distor-
tionary taxation. To ensure government solvency, spending cuts or tax increases must
stabilise debt. In the absence of deadweight losses, the timing of tax and spending
changes cannot matter in this simple endowment economy: unexpected delays in fiscal
consolidation would have no effect, so long as fiscal policy ultimately adjusts to satisfy
(6). In the presence of deadweight losses, however, the discounted value of these losses
erodes the resources available to the household for consumption. If a tax-based
consolidation is delayed, the required tax increase rises, and the associated deadweight
losses rise even faster.
Consider the household’s consumption decision, (7), when only taxes adjust to
stabilise debt and gt  g 0. Using bt1 þ g 0=ð1  bÞ ¼ Et
P
s b
systþs from (6), the
consumption decision becomes
ct
1 b ¼ at1 þ Et
X1
s¼0
bsy 1 stþs  wðstþsÞ2
h i
: ð9Þ
Altering the timing of a tax-based consolidation does not affect the size of the
discounted tax revenues needed to maintain fiscal solvency, but does affect the
expected discounted sum of the deadweight losses
Et
X1
s¼0
bsy wðstþsÞ2
h i
: ð10Þ
From familiar tax smoothing arguments, the discounted sum of these deadweight
losses is minimised by an immediate one-off increase in the tax rate to a level sufficient
to satisfy the government’s budget. Any delay in the implementation of the
consolidation deviates from tax smoothing, raising the discounted value of deadweight
losses and reducing consumption. News of a speedy consolidation that brings forward
the expected date of a tax-based consolidation increases consumption, while news of a
delayed consolidation that raises deadweight losses reduces consumption.
2.2. Composition Uncertainty
To illustrate composition uncertainty, we assume that households expect a fiscal
consolidation n periods from now, with fiscal policy changing taxes or government
spending to new levels that satisfy (6) at period t + n. Households expect the
consolidation to be spending based with probability 1  x, and tax based with
probability x. To stabilise debt at btþn1, a spending-based consolidation sets g 1 from
period t + n onwards to satisfy
© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
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g 1 ¼ ys0  ð1 bÞbtþn1; ð11Þ
where tax rate remains at s0. In the case of a tax-based consolidation, the new tax rate,
s1, solves
ys1 ¼ g 0 þ ð1 bÞbtþn1: ð12Þ
Spending-based consolidation requires a cut in spending and a tax-based consol-
idation requires an increase in tax revenues of an equal amount to ensure that debt is
stabilised at the level btþn1 from that point onwards. Consumption under each type of
consolidation, from period t + n onwards, is
cs ¼ ð1 bÞðatþn1  btþn1Þ þ y 1 wðs1Þ2
h i
 g 0; ð13Þ
cg ¼ ð1 bÞðatþn1  btþn1Þ þ y 1 wðs0Þ2
h i
 g 1: ð14Þ
Before consolidation, consumption lies between these two cases, so that there will be
a positive (negative) jump in consumption at the point when the consolidation is
revealed to be spending (tax) based. The exact size of the jump depends on
expectations of the consolidation. Consumption before the consolidation is
c0 ¼ ð1 bÞðat1  bt1Þ þ ð1 bÞ
Xn1
s¼0
bsy½1 wðs0Þ2  ð1 bÞ
Xn1
s¼0
bsg 0
þ bnfð1 xÞy½1 wðs0Þ2 þ xy½1 wðs1Þ2g  bn½ð1 xÞg 1 þ xg 0
¼ ð1 bÞðat1  bt1Þ þ y½1 wðs0Þ2  g 0
 bnfxy½wðs1Þ2  wðs0Þ2g þ bn½ð1 xÞðg 0  g 1Þ:
ð15Þ
Pre-consolidation consumption takes account of the accumulation of government
debt in the n periods before consolidation and also attaches probability weights to the
types of consolidation that will ultimately emerge. The current consumption gain
(loss) from an anticipated government spending (tax) based consolidation is clear.
These expectations drive current consumption and saving behaviour: current
consumption rises if agents anticipate a future cut in spending but falls if they fear a
future rise in taxes. While the magnitude of the realised spending cuts or tax increases
is unaffected by the these expectations – since they do not affect debt dynamics prior
to the consolidation – the accumulation of net foreign assets changes. Combining the
government’s and households’ flow budget constraints, prior to the fiscal consolida-
tion, net foreign assets evolve according to
bðat  btÞ ¼ at1  bt1 þ y 1 wðs0Þ2
h i
 c0  g 0: ð16Þ
Substituting for the pre-consolidation level of consumption implies that for any
period prior to the consolidation, n  s,
© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
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ðatþs1 btþs1Þðatþs2 btþs2Þ¼ bns xyw½ðs1Þ2ðs0Þ2ð1xÞðg 0 g 1Þ
n o
; ð17Þ
and the accumulated change in net foreign assets between t and t + n is
ðatþn1  btþn1Þ  ðat1  bt1Þ ¼ ð1 b
nÞ
1 b xyw½ðs
1Þ2  ðs0Þ2  ð1 xÞðg 0  g 1Þ
n o
:
ð18Þ
When the expected deadweight losses from the tax increase, xyw½ðs1Þ2  ðs0Þ2, are
greater than the expected cut in government spending, ð1  xÞðg 0  g 1Þ, households
accumulate net foreign assets in anticipation of the deadweight losses to come. Since
these expectations are formed over the relative probabilities of each type of
consolidation, households will accumulate more (fewer) net foreign assets when they
anticipate that the consolidation will be tax (spending) based.
When a spending-based consolidation is realised, the jump in consumption is
cg  c0 ¼ ð1 bÞ ðatþn1  btþn1Þ  ðat1  bt1Þ½  þ g 0  g 1; ð19Þ
þ bnfxy½wðs1Þ2  wðs0Þ2  ð1 xÞðg 0  g 1Þg
¼ xy½wðs1Þ2  wðs0Þ2  ð1 xÞðg 0  g 1Þ þ g 0  g 1:
ð20Þ
The consolidation is classified as expansionary if the jump in consumption exceeds
the cut in government spending
cg  c0[ g 0  g 1; ð21Þ
which requires
xy½wðs1Þ2  wðs0Þ2[ ð1 xÞðg 0  g 1Þ: ð22Þ
To achieve an expansionary fiscal consolidation, the expected size of tax distortions
(not the tax revenues themselves) needs to exceed the expected size of the
government expenditure cut, both of which reflect economic agents’ views about
the relative probability of each type of consolidation. Any delay in consolidation raises
the required increases in tax revenues or cuts in expenditure because initially the
government’s finances are on an unsustainable path. With deadweight losses
increasing non-linearly in the tax rate, the losses associated with tax increases will be
rising faster than the equivalent cuts in expenditure. This means that unexpected
delays in consolidation efforts will reduce current consumption at the moment the
delay is revealed but are more likely to support an expansionary consolidation should
the ultimate fiscal consolidation be spending based.
2.3. Anticipated Consolidations
In the previous scenario, the uncertainty over the fiscal consolidation was resolved only
when the consolidation actually occurred in period t + n. However, the nature of the
consolidation could be revealed at an earlier date, say t + m, m  n. The level of
© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
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consumption prior to the news will be the same as given in (15). If it is then revealed in
period t + m that the fiscal consolidation will be spending based, then from that period
on consumption will be given by
cg ¼ ð1 bÞðatþm1  btþm1Þ þ y½1 wðs0Þ2  g 0 þ bnmðg 0  g 1Þ
¼ ð1 bÞðatþn1  btþn1Þ þ y½1 wðs0Þ2  g 1;
ð23Þ
and will not change when the actual consolidation is realised. Consumption will jump
only in period t + m when the news of the type of consolidation is revealed
cg  c0 ¼ ð1 bÞ ðatþm1  btþm1Þ  ðat1  bt1Þ½  þ bnmðg 0  g 1Þ; ð24Þ
þbnfxy½wðs1Þ2  wðs0Þ2  ð1 xÞðg 0  g 1Þg: ð25Þ
Accumulating the change in net foreign assets between period t and the date of the
announcement of the consolidation type, t + m
ðatþm1  btþm1Þ  ðat1bt1Þ ¼ b
nmð1 bmÞ
1 b tfxyw½ðs
1Þ2  ðs0Þ2
 ð1 xÞðg 0  g 1Þg
ð26Þ
allows us to rewrite the consumption jump as
cg  c0 ¼ bnmxfðg 0  g 1Þ þ y½wðs1Þ2  wðs0Þ2g: ð27Þ
When the fiscal consolidation at time t + n is known to be spending based at time
t + m, m  n, there is an immediate positive jump in private consumption. The size of
the jump rises with the weight attached to the tax-based consolidation, x, but falls with
the time between the announcement and realisation of the consolidation, n  m.
Unless the consolidation was always known to be spending based, there is a positive
jump in private consumption upon the announcement at time t + m that the
consolidation will be spending based. When the consolidation is realised, there is no
further jump in private consumption but there is a decline in public consumption that
contracts aggregate demand. This is because the realisation of the consolidation no
longer provides any additional information. This leads to an additional condition for
observing an expansionary fiscal consolidation: the realisation of the consolidation
must contain the new information required to boost private sector consumption.
In sum, fiscal consolidations are more likely to be expansionary when economic
agents were expecting them to be tax based with a high associated deadweight loss but
the realised consolidation is spending-based. Conversely, the biggest consumption
decline occurs when the consolidation is tax based, but economic agents were
expecting cuts in government spending. To observe an expansionary fiscal consolida-
tion, the realisation of the consolidation must contain the positive information which
induces households to significantly increase private consumption.
We explore the quantitative importance of uncertainty over the timing and
composition of fiscal consolidations in a full DSGE model below. Our experiments
in that model differ from this simple example in a crucial respect: in line with the data,
we consider temporary, rather than permanent, consolidations.
© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
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3. Quantitative Model of Fiscal Consolidation
We now turn to study the macroeconomic consequences of uncertain fiscal consol-
idations in a richer and more plausible environment. Since debt service costs are
particularly important in determining debt dynamics at high debt levels, we use a
conventional New Keynesian model modified to allow occasional fiscal consolidations.
Consolidations are triggered after debt rises to a level that breaches a stochastic ‘fiscal
limit’. The fiscal limit is the maximum level of debt the government is able to support,
which is constrained by the tax Laffer curve and the realisations of shocks. Households
anticipate that the government will attempt to stabilise debt through fiscal consoli-
dations in advance of reaching this limit. Political factors such as a war of attrition over
who bears the costs of a particular consolidation, however, may induce the government
to leave consolidation to the last minute.8 To accord with this evidence, the probability
of a fiscal consolidation rises with the level of government debt.
We also allow periodically explosive lump-sum transfers. In addition to being a
feature of the data, temporarily explosive transfers produce a plausible transition from
relatively low to very high debt levels. This assumption also changes the distribution of
fiscal limits and, therefore, the likelihood of fiscal consolidation at a given debt level.
Bi (2012) shows that the possibility of explosive transfers can significantly lower
expected future fiscal surpluses and generate a more dispersed distribution of fiscal
limits, making it more likely that the economy will hit its fiscal limit at relatively low
levels of debt like those observed in countries’ experiences.
Households supply labour to intermediate goods producing firms with Rotemberg-
style price adjustment. Their labour andprofit incomeare taxed.The setupdelivers a rich
set of monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Sticky price adjustment gives monetary
policy real effects that affect both the tax base – labour income – and real debt service
costs. Changes in taxes or government spending not only have the usual fiscal
consequences but also influence inflation through either the labour supply response
to distortionary taxation or the aggregate demand effect of changes in government
spending. These inflationary consequences of fiscal consolidations generate resource
costs that go beyond the usual deadweight losses of distortionary taxation.
3.1. Households
The cashless economy is populated by a large number of identical households of size 1
with preferences given by
E0
X1
t¼0
btuðct ;ntÞ;
where b ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s subjective discount factor, ct is consumption and
nt the household’s labour supply. The household receives nominal wages, Wt , and
monopoly profits, !t , from the firm, both of which are taxed at the rate st , and
lump-sum transfers, zt , from the government. The household chooses consumption,
8 Alesina et al. (2006) find that political factors play a significant role in determining when a consolidation
is implemented, consistent with war-of-attrition effects.
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hours worked and nominal bond holdings, Bt , to maximise utility subject to the budget
constraint
Ptct þ Bt
Rt
¼ Bt1 þ ð1 stÞðWtnt þ Pt!tÞ þ Ptzt : ð28Þ
The maximisation problem yields the typical first-order conditions
1
Rt
¼ bEt ucðt þ 1Þ
ucðtÞ
1
ptþ1
; ð29Þ
 unðtÞ
ucðtÞ ¼ wtð1 stÞ; ð30Þ
where pt  Pt=Pt1 is the inflation rate and wt  Wt=Pt is the real wage.
3.2. Final Goods Production
Final goods are used for private and public consumption. Competitive final goods
firms buy the differentiated products produced by intermediate goods producers to
construct consumption aggregates, which have the CES (constant elasticity of
substitution) form
yt ¼
Z 1
0
ytðiÞ
h1
h di
  h
h1
; ð31Þ
where yt is aggregate output, ytðiÞ is the output of intermediate good firm i and h > 1 is
the elasticity of demand for each firm’s product. Cost minimisation for final goods
producers results in the demand curve for intermediate good i
ytðiÞ ¼ ptðiÞ
Pt
 h
yt ð32Þ
and an associated price index for final goods
Pt ¼
Z 1
0
ptðiÞ1hdi
  1
1h
: ð33Þ
3.3. Intermediate Goods Production
The imperfectly competitive intermediate goods firms are subject to Rotemberg
adjustment costs that penalise large price changes in excess of steady-state inflation
rates. Price adjustment costs make the firm’s problem dynamic
max
X1
t¼0
R0;t ptðiÞytðiÞ  mctPtytðiÞ  /
2
ptðiÞ
pt1ðiÞ
1
p
 1
 2
Ptyt
( )
; ð34Þ
s:t: ytðiÞ ¼ ptðiÞ
Pt
 h
yt ; ð35Þ
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where mct ¼ wt=At is the real marginal cost implied by a linear production function
and ytðiÞ ¼ AtntðiÞ. Productivity, At , is common to all firms. The first-order condition,
after imposing symmetry across firms, is
ð1 hÞ þ hmct  / ptp  1
  pt
p
þ b/Et ucðt þ 1Þ
ucðtÞ
ptþ1
p
 1
  ptþ1
p
ytþ1
yt
¼ 0;
which represents the non-linear New Keynesian Phillips curve under Rotemberg
pricing.9
Monopoly profits, which the government taxes when households receive them, are
!t ¼ yt  mctyt  /
2
pt
p
 1
 2
yt : ð36Þ
The aggregate resource constraint is
ct þ gt ¼ Atnt 1 /
2
pt
p
 1
 2 
making clear the resource losses that rapid price adjustment produces.
3.4. Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Monetary policy follows a simple inflation-targeting rule
Rt  R ¼ aðpt  pÞ; ð37Þ
where p is the target inflation rate. In a deterministic steady state, Rt ¼ R and pt ¼ p.
Fiscal transfers evolve exogenously, but their process depends on a regime-switching
index xzt
zðxzt Þ ¼
ð1 qzÞz þ qzzt1 if xzt ¼ 1 ðqz\1Þ
fzzt1 if xzt ¼ 2 ðfz[ 1Þ

with xzt following a transition matrix of
pz1 1  pz1
1  pz2 pz2
 
:
The Markov regime-switching process moves from a stationary process with qz\ 1 to
one where transfers explode with fz [ 1. There can be prolonged periods when
growing transfers produce sustained increases in government debt, which can prompt
attempts at fiscal consolidation. Periodic instability in transfers is common to many
advanced economies and, as the IMF (2009) reports, is likely to become more
widespread as populations age.
Monetary and fiscal policies must satisfy the government’s flow budget constraint
Bt
Rt
þ stðWtnt þ Pt!tÞ ¼ Bt1 þ Ptgt þ Ptzt : ð38Þ
While fiscal policy has obvious effects on debt dynamics, monetary policy will also
have a role to play, especially when debt stocks are large.
9 To a first order, Rotemberg and Calvo pricing deliver identical Phillips curves.
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4. Fiscal Limit and Fiscal Consolidations
4.1. Distribution of the Fiscal Limit
Laffer curves provide a natural starting point for quantifying the fiscal limit from the
tax revenue side of the government’s budget constraint. At the peak of the Laffer
curve, tax revenues reach their maximum and, for a given level of total government
expenditures, the present value of primary surpluses is maximised. Revenues,
expenditures and discount rates, of course, vary with the shocks hitting the economy,
generating a distribution for the maximum debt-GDP level that can be supported.
To compute the distribution, we assume that the monetary authority keeps the
inflation rate at its target (pt ¼ p),10 so the peak of the Laffer curve is a function of the
exogenous state of the economy ðAt ; gtÞ. At the Laffer curve peak, define
smaxt ¼ smaxðAt ; gtÞ; ð39Þ
Tmaxt ¼ T maxðAt ; gtÞ; ð40Þ
where the function smax (T max) maps the state into the tax rate (revenues) at the peak.
Evidently, the stochastic processes governing the exogenous states induce stochastic
processes for both the tax rate that maximises revenues and the maximum level of
revenues.
The fiscal limit is defined, following Bi (2012), as the discounted sum of expected
maximum primary surpluses in all future periods.
B  ¼ E
X1
t¼0
bt bp|{z}
political factor
umaxc ðAt ; gtÞ
umaxc ðA0; g0Þ
½T maxðAt ; gt ; zt ; xzt Þ  gt  zt |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
smaxt
: ð41Þ
The government spending, gt , follows an AR(1) process that is calibrated to data, see
Table 2.11
The stochastic discount factor is obtained when tax rates are at the peak of the Laffer
curve, btumaxc ðAt ; gtÞ=umaxc ðA0; g0Þ, but modified to allow for a political risk parameter
bp . Higher political risk – lower bp – lends itself to multiple interpretations that reflect
the private sector’s beliefs about policy. Most straightforward is the idea that policy
makers have effectively shorter planning horizons than the private sector; see
Acemoglu et al. (2008). To see this, rewrite the discount factor in (41) as
ðbpbÞt=ðbpÞt1, so that a lower value of bp reduces the present value of maximum
surpluses. An alternative interpretation is that private agents place probability mass on
both the maximum surpluses ðsmaxÞ and on zero primary surpluses. Rewrite the
surpluses as bps
max þ ð1  bpÞ  0 for this interpretation. Nothing we do hinges on the
10 Fiscal consolidations can and do affect equilibrium inflation rates. By fixing inflation in computing the
fiscal limit, we are assuming that seigniorage revenues are not an important source of fiscal financing in the
long run, a plausible assumption for advanced economies.
11 When computing the fiscal limits, it is necessary to assume government spending follows an exogenous
process. Endogenising spending through a fiscal rule or state-dependent fiscal consolidations is a daunting
task as it involves solving a fixed-point problem by computing the fiscal limit and solving the non-linear
model simultaneously. More importantly, Bi (2012) shows, in a similar setup to this article, that current
government spending has a negligible impact on the fiscal limit distribution. Instead, it is the variation in the
potential paths of transfers that drive the distribution of the fiscal limit.
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precise interpretation attached to bp . As a practical matter, setting bp\ 1 serves to shift
down the distribution of the fiscal limit, which generates occurrences of fiscal
consolidations at lower levels of debt similar to those observed in the data. Moreover,
as discussed in Section 3, the possibility of temporarily explosive transfers leads to a
wider dispersion of the fiscal limit, which also creates the possibility of consolidations at
relatively low debt levels.
We compute the unconditional distribution of the fiscal limit, f ðBÞ, using Markov
Chain Monte Carlo simulation, as Appendix A describes.
4.2. State-dependent Fiscal Consolidations
For the state-dependent fiscal consolidations, the government spending process and
the tax rule follow
gt  g ¼ mgt ; ð42Þ
st  s ¼ mst þ csðbt1  bÞ: ð43Þ
Fiscal consolidations take the form of positive values for the intercept terms, mgt and
mst , implying reductions in government spending and increases in taxation.
At each period t, the effective fiscal limit, bt , is drawn from the distribution of the
fiscal limit. We treat the choice of bt as random, being driven by policy makers’
perceived costs of fiscal consolidation. If the existing debt level, bt1, surpasses the
effective fiscal limit, the government undertakes a consolidation that lasts for four
Table 2
Model Calibration
Parameter Calibration
Discount factor b 0.99
Elasticity of substitution h 11
Rotemberg adjustment parameter / 100
Inflation rate p 1.03 (annual)
Technology A 1
Labour supply n 0.25
Government spending/GDP g/y 0.21
Government transfer/GDP z/y 0.18
Government debt/GDP b/y 0.50 (annual)
Tax rate τ 0.41
Fiscal rule parameter cs 0.5/4
Taylor rule parameter a 1.5
Political factor bp 0.85
Spending shock persistence qg 0.9
Spending shock variance r2g ð0:03g Þ2
Tax shock variance r2s ð0:03sÞ2
Transfer persistence qz 0.8
fz 1.003
Transfer regime parameter pz 0.975
Length of consolidations h 4
Tax-type consolidation ms 0.01
Spending-type consolidation mg 0.01y
Probability of tax-type FC x 0.75
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periods, in line with AA’s data. We consider three models of state-dependent fiscal
consolidations, which we denote xi (i = τ, g, m). For the xs (xg ) model, we consider the
case where state-dependent fiscal consolidations will always be tax (spending) based.
Economic agents know this to be the case: there is only timing uncertainty, no
composition uncertainty. In the xm model, economic agents attach a probability (x) to
the possibility that the realised fiscal consolidations will be tax based, denoted as xms ,
and the complementary probability (1  x) that it will be spending based, denoted as
xmg . Outside of periods of fiscal consolidation, the government sets m
s
t ¼ mgt ¼ 0.
We use a state variable xt to track the path of fiscal consolidations: in normal times –
no consolidation – it equals 1; in a tax-based consolidation, xt switches to 2 and the
consolidation lasts for another three periods, so xtþ1 ¼ 3; xtþ2 ¼ 4; xtþ3 ¼ 5, before
returning to the normal no-consolidation state; in a spending-based consolidation that
lasts four periods, xt ¼ 6; xtþ1 ¼ 7; xtþ2 ¼ 8; xtþ3 ¼ 9, before exiting. 12 These policy
dynamics are summarised by
if bt1\ bt : no consolidation ðxt ¼ 1;mst ¼ mgt ¼ 0Þ
otherwise
with prob x : tax-based consolidationðxt . . . xtþ3 ¼ 2; . . .; 5Þ
ðmst . . .mstþ3 ¼ ms;mgt . . .mgtþ3 ¼ 0Þ
with prob 1 x : spending-based consolidation ðxt . . . xtþ3 ¼ 6; . . .; 9Þ
ðmst . . .mstþ3 ¼ 0;mgt . . .mgtþ3 ¼ mg Þ
8>>><
>>>>:
Even though the households know the distribution of the fiscal limit, both the
timing and the composition of consolidation are uncertain. The xs and xg models
follow the same structure except that there is no composition uncertainty and the
probability x is set equal to one for model xs and zero for the case of xg .
4.3. Unanticipated Independent and Identically Distributed (i.i.d.) Fiscal Consolidations
To draw out the role of expectations, we contrast state-dependent fiscal consolidations,
xiði ¼ s; g ;mÞ, with the same-sized consolidations implemented through a sequence of
unanticipated i.i.d. policy shocks on government spending and tax, labelled as
siði ¼ s; g Þ.13 Fiscal behaviour obeys
gt  g ¼ egt egt 	 i:i:d: Nð0; r2g Þ; ð44Þ
st  s ¼ csðbt1  bÞ þ est est 	 i:i:d: Nð0; r2sÞ: ð45Þ
We simulate a series of shocks that mimic the size of the state-dependent fiscal
consolidations and then isolate the effects of timing uncertainty on the marginal
impact of a fiscal consolidation. Because the expected value of the i.i.d. shocks is zero,
this device removes the expectations effects associated with state-dependent fiscal
consolidations.
12 After a consolidation, policy stays in the no-consolidation state for at least one period.
13 Persistent shocks do not change the qualitative results.
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5. Calibration and Solution
The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency to EU-14 data. We focus on those
economies because they feature heavily in the AA data set: those countries have
undertaken sizeable consolidations and they have occasionally enjoyed consolidations
that AA label as ‘expansionary’.
We calibrate fiscal parameters to match average EU-14 data from 1971 to 2007.14 In
steady state, government purchases are 21% of GDP, lump-sum transfers are 18% of
GDP, and the tax rate is 0.41, implying a steady-state government debt-GDP ratio
of 50.38% when the discount factor, b, is chosen to deliver an annual real interest rate
of 4.1%. The tax adjustment parameter, c, is 0.5 at an annual rate, which is close to the
average of estimates in EU-14. The regime-switching parameters pz1 and p
z
2 are
calibrated to 0.975, so that the average length of each regime is 10 years. A higher pz
leads to a more dispersed distribution of fiscal limits. fz is set at 1.003, implying an
increase of 12.75% in transfers in 10 years. As summarised in Table 2, the calibrations
for the shock processes for tax and spending follow Traum and Yang (2010), among
others.
Consistent with data, consolidations last 1 year and are calibrated, through the ms
and mg terms, to 1% of steady-state GDP. The International Country Risk Guide’s
index of political risk offers one way to calibrate the political factor, bp , as Arteta and
Galina (2008) discuss. The average of that index across EU-14 countries was 85 of 100
during the period 1984–2009.
Utility is given by uðc;nÞ ¼ log c þ vnlogð1  nÞ. vn is set to imply that the
household spends 25% of its time working in steady-state and the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply is three. Time endowment and steady-state productivity are normalised
to one. For simplicity, we keep productivity at its steady state level but none of the
results below hinge on this assumption. The demand elasticity, h, is 11 and the
Rotemberg adjustment parameter, /, is 100, which is equivalent to 26.7% of the firms
re-optimising each quarter in a Calvo-type overlapping contracts model, as in Keen and
Wang (2007) Gross inflation is 1.03 at an annual rate and the Taylor rule parameter is
set to 1.5 in the benchmark case.
Given this calibration, the distribution of the fiscal limit can be simulated by
drawing from the distributions of the exogenous shocks. Figure 1 reports the
kernel-estimated cumulative distribution of the fiscal limit. As the debt rises, so does
the probability that debt will exceed the effective fiscal limit, bt , drawn from the
distribution. The fat tail is generated by the possibility of entering the explosive
transfers regime.
We solve the full non-linear model in Section 3, coupled with the fiscal limit
described in Section 4, using the monotone mapping method. The solution method,
based on Coleman (1991) and Davig (2004), discretises the state space and conjectures
candidate decision rules that reduce the system to a set of first-order expectational
difference equations. Decision rules map the state at period t into the stock of
government debt, the real wage and the inflation rate in the same period, denoted as
bt ¼ f bðwtÞ;wt ¼ f wðwtÞ; pt ¼ f pðwtÞ with wt being the vector of states that Appendix
14 Appendix B describes the data.
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C describes. After finding the decision rules, we solve for the bond-pricing rule,
qt ¼ f qðwtÞ, using the government budget constraint. The interest rate on government
bonds can also be solved using Rt ¼ 1=qt , denoted as f R ðwtÞ. Appendix C describes the
non-linear solution method, and Appendix D assesses the accuracy of that solution
using the dynamic Euler equation accuracy test of Den Haan (2010).
6. Fiscal Consolidation: Timing Uncertainty Only
Fiscal consolidations can occur across a wide range of debt levels, but it is reasonable to
posit that the probability of a fiscal consolidation is rising in the debt-GDP ratio.
Consolidations at low debt levels are more surprising than those that follow sustained
increases in debt. Using the policy rules from subsection 4.2, the consolidation
intercepts, mst and m
g
t , depend on the state variable xt ; whenever government debt
exceeds the stochastic effective fiscal limit, a fiscal consolidation occurs and lasts for
1 year. This section focuses on uncertainty over the timing and the duration of
consolidations.
6.1. Tax-based Fiscal Consolidation
Tax-based consolidations, labelled as xs, follow the rule
xs : st  s ¼ msðxtÞ þ csðbt1  bÞ:
The size of the consolidation, ms, depends on the state-dependent variable xt , which
in turn hinges on government liabilities, bt1, and the stochastic fiscal limit, bt . With
consolidation lasting four periods, regime change is governed by
if bt1\bt : xt ¼ 1;mst ¼ 0
otherwise: xt . . .xtþ3 ¼ 2; . . .; 5;mst . . .mstþ3 ¼ ms.

If government debt exceeds the stochastic fiscal limit, bt , fiscal policy implements a
1-year consolidation by raising taxes beyond the level implied by the usual fiscal rule –
when msðxtÞ  0 – in an attempt to reduce government debt.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
0
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Fig. 1. Cumulative Distribution of the Fiscal Limit
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We contrast the xs model with the same-sized tax consolidation implemented through
a sequence of unanticipated i.i.d. policy shocks, labelled as ss, using the tax rule15
ss: st  s ¼ csðbt1  bÞ þ est :
Expectations play a central role in determining the macroeconomic impacts of a
consolidation. When a consolidation changes the policy regime, agents know the new
policy rules remain in effect for four periods and adjust their expectations accordingly.
A successful consolidation lowers the probability of hitting the fiscal limit in the future,
reducing the likelihood of further consolidations. A sequence of surprise policies, in
contrast, has no such effect, as it does not affect the likelihood of future consolidations.
Figure 2 compares the impulse responses from the ss (dotted lines) and the xs (solid
lines) cases when the initial expected probability of fiscal consolidation is only 0.05 and
the consolidation occurs in period 5. The Figure plots the variable differences between
their values under a fiscal consolidation and those without consolidation. With a low
probability of consolidation, the realised consolidation comes as a surprise in both
cases.
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Fig. 2. Tax-based Consolidations at a Low Debt Level
Notes. i.i.d. consolidation, ss, and state-dependent consolidations, xs, when the initial probability
of consolidation is 0.05. Plots variable differences between their values under consolidation and
those without consolidation. Tax, interest and inflation rates are in percentage points, while the
other variables are in terms of percentage of their steady-state values.
15 Fiscal rules of this form have been used extensively in the literature – see, for example, Leeper (1991)
and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000).
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In the xs case, once the fiscal consolidation begins, economic agents know that taxes
will remain high for four quarters, raising real wages and marginal costs. Firms raise
prices in anticipation of this sustained rise in marginal costs; inflation jumps up and
gradually declines over the course of the consolidation. While the initial jump helps
deflate the real value of government debt, the active monetary policy raises real interest
rates in response to the rise in inflation, offsetting some of the debt reduction.16 In the
ss case, consolidations arrive as i.i.d. shocks. Price setters are repeatedly surprised by
the tax hikes, which raise marginal costs and inflation, though by less than when
regime changes. Active monetary policy does not raise real interest rates by as much
and the repeated inflation surprises drive a wedge between ex ante and ex post real
interest rates, making the consolidation more effective in stabilising debt.
Since debt levels are low in this case, there is little of the expectation effects
highlighted in the simple model: fiscal consolidations were seen as remote prior to the
consolidation, and remain so afterwards. High debt levels, on the other hand, elevate
the probabilities of hitting the fiscal limit and of consolidation. When agents anticipate
consolidation, they alter their behaviour in pre-consolidation periods, and the
consolidation itself can have smaller effects when it is finally realised.
Figure 3 repeats the same experiment as in Figure 2 but with the initial debt-GDP
ratio at 160%, which raises the probability of fiscal consolidation to 0.75. When a
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Fig. 3. Tax-based Consolidations at a High Debt Level
Notes. i.i.d. consolidation, ss, and state-dependent consolidations, xs, when the initial probability
of consolidation is 0.75.
16 Defining the ex post real rate at t as rt  Rt  ptþ1, the consolidation in period nine generates surprise
inflation that reduces the realised return on debt sold in period 8.
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consolidation is expected but has not yet arrived, it generates negative inflation
surprises, which worsen debt dynamics under an active monetary policy. As a result,
when the fiscal consolidation is realised, its negative impact is not as great as it would
have been if the consolidation had been unanticipated. Relative to the case where the
consolidation was not perceived to be imminent, the marginal impact on debt is now
reversed: removing the uncertainty of the consolidation duration removes the large
negative inflation surprises that come with the xs case. Since these surprises are acting
on a very large stock of debt, removing the uncertainty stabilises the debt. This
reversal is consistent with the analysis of the simple model above, highlighting the
importance of expectations over the likelihood and the duration of fiscal consoli-
dations.
To understand inflation dynamics and the nature of the surprises induced by state-
dependent fiscal consolidations, we plot the level of inflation and expected inflation for
the xs model in Figure 4. The top panel shows the case when the initial probability of
fiscal consolidation is 0.05. The triangle dash-dotted line shows the path of pt and the
square solid line shows that of Et1pt when a fiscal consolidation occurs at period 5.
The tax rate rises, labour supply contracts and consumption falls. Higher marginal
costs further raise inflation and, since the consolidation was unexpected, there is an
inflation surprise in the first period of the consolidation. There is no inflation surprise
during the consolidation or in the period immediately following the exit.
If the probability of fiscal consolidation is 0.75, shown in the bottom panel,
inflationary expectations are significantly higher; actual inflation, on the other hand,
mimics the path in the top panel. When consolidation does occur at period 5, taxes
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Fig. 4. Inflation Dynamics Comparison in the xsModel
Notes. Consolidation occurs at period 5. Inflation rates are in percentage points.
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and inflation rise, creating a positive inflation surprise. In all other periods, there is a
non-zero probability attached to consolidation, creating an ongoing inflation surprise.
6.2. Spending-Based Fiscal Consolidations
We now consider government spending-based consolidations, labelled xg . Spending
policy obeys
xg : gt  g ¼ mg ðxtÞ: ð46Þ
When government debt exceeds the stochastic fiscal limit, bt , the government cuts its
spending by mg for 1 year. We contrast this xg model with the same-sized spending
consolidations implemented through a sequence of unanticipated i.i.d. policy shocks
sg : gt  g ¼ egt ;
which effectively shuts down the expectations effects associated with the
state-dependent fiscal consolidations in the xg model.
Figure 5 compares the impulse responses from sg and xg models when the expected
probability of fiscal consolidation is low. Once a consolidation begins, price-setters
expect it to last for a year in the xg model. Inflation falls immediately and then slowly
returns to steady state. With an active monetary policy, lower inflation lowers real
interest rates, reducing debt service costs and maintaining the size of the tax base. In
contrast, in the sg model, price-setters fail to anticipate the subsequent decreases in
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Fig. 5. Spending-based Consolidations at a Low Debt Level
Notes. i.i.d. consolidation, sg , and state-dependent consolidations, xg , when the initial probability
of consolidation is 0.05.
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government spending and inflation does not fall by as much on impact. Uncertainty
over the duration of a spending-based consolidation reduces its deflationary conse-
quences, in contrast to tax-based consolidations.
Figure 6 considers the same experiments except that the probability of consolidation
is high. In the xg model, economic agents anticipate that government spending cuts
are imminent and the no-consolidation case contains positive inflation surprises as
consolidations are expected but not realised. Outcomes are quite similar to those
under lower debt levels. One noticeable difference is that there is a smaller increase in
consumption when the consolidation is realised, as households were already expecting
government spending to be cut. Similarly, the initial deflation is smaller as it was
already factored into inflation expectations.
6.3. Key Message of Timing Uncertainty
Output multipliers are a convenient way to summarise differences across the si and xi
(i = τ, g) policy scenarios. The multipliers are computed as
Cytþk ¼
Pk
j¼0
Qj
i¼0 r
1
tþi
 
yshocktþj  ynotþj
 
Pk
j¼0
Qj
i¼0 r
1
tþi
 
ðf shocktþj  f notþjÞ
; ð47Þ
where the ‘shock’ superscript indicates that the consolidation has been realised and
the ‘no’ superscript that it has not. rt is the real interest rate and f denotes the type of
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Fig. 6. Spending-based Consolidations at a High Debt Level
Notes. i.i.d. consolidation, sg , and state-dependent consolidations, xg , when the initial probability
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© 2013 The Author(s). The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.
F52 TH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L [ F E B R U A R Y
fiscal adjustment: ft is ðst yÞ for tax-based and ðgtÞ for spending-based consolidations.
The multiplier measures the discounted percentage change in cumulative output for
one discounted unit of fiscal consolidation measure.
Figure 7 shows that at relatively low levels of initial debt, i.i.d. tax and government
spending consolidations – labelled ss and sg – provide upper and lower bounds for the
same-sized consolidations of a known duration. Not knowing the duration limits, the
inflationary (deflationary) response to the tax (spending)-based fiscal consolidation
which, in turn, affects the extent to which monetary policy raises (reduces) real interest
rates during the consolidation. At high debt levels, however, tax-based consolidations
of known duration outperform those of uncertain duration, while government
spending-based consolidations perform in a similar way regardless of the duration
uncertainty. The expansionary effect from the xs model is due to the fact that the tax
increase today reduces the need for future tax increases, which would otherwise have
negative effects on current debt service costs and the tax base. This model retains the
key message from the simple model of Section 3 over the timing of fiscal
consolidations: a realised consolidation that reduces the expectation of higher future
tax distortions mitigates the negative impact of the consolidation; such effects are
associated with tax-based consolidations rather than spending-based ones.
7. Fiscal Consolidation: Timing and Composition Uncertainty
In practice, fiscal consolidations are uncertain both in their timing and their
composition. We now consider the two sources of uncertainty jointly – a fiscal
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Fig. 7. Output Multiplier
Notes. i.i.d. consolidations, si , and state-dependent consolidations, xi , for i = τ,g, under different
initial probabilities of consolidation.
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consolidation can be based on tax increases with probability x and spending cuts with
probability 1  x.
7.1. Benchmark Case: x = 0.75 and a = 1.5
In line with the AA data, the probability x is calibrated to 0.75, so that a tax-based
consolidation is three times more likely than a spending-based consolidation. Setting
a = 1.5 makes monetary policy actively combat inflation in the manner that Taylor
(1993) suggests.
Figure 8 compares the impulse responses for the two types of consolidations, xms and
xmg , when the initial probability of fiscal consolidation is low. There are few expectation
effects beyond the fact that when a consolidation occurs, economic agents know it will
last for 1 year. If the fiscal consolidation turns out to be tax based, xms , the impulse
responses are very similar to those observed when tax-based consolidations are the only
possible type, the xs model in Figure 2. Similarly, if the realised consolidation is
spending based, xmg , then the impulse responses are very similar to the outcomes when
spending is the only possible instrument, the xg model in Figure 5. When the
probability of fiscal consolidation is low, economic agents do not expect a consolida-
tion of any kind, so uncertainty over the composition is not important.
In Figure 9, government debt is high and agents believe a fiscal consolidation is
imminent. Now the composition uncertainty matters. Agents place a probability of 0.75
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on tax increases, anchoring their expectations on inflationary increases in distortionary
taxation prior to the consolidation. If a spending-based consolidation actually occurs,
xmg , it surprises agents and reduces inflation relative to the no-consolidation case. The
deflationary spending-based consolidation, together with active monetary policy,
reduces real interest rates, raising the tax base and reducing debt service costs. Real
wages rise relative to the no-consolidation case, and consumption rises significantly.
When the realised consolidations are the tax-based type, xms , the results are
qualitatively similar to the case without composition uncertainty, xs, since tax increases
were largely anticipated. During the fiscal consolidation, higher tax rates raise
marginal costs and inflation, and active monetary policy raises real interest rates. This
accounts for the relatively poor performance of the tax-based consolidations in
stabilising debt when debt levels are high.
Figure 10 compares the output multiplier under the state-dependent consolidations
with composition uncertainty, xms and x
m
g , and tax increases and spending cuts in the x
s
and xg models. At low levels of debt, the two types of consolidations without
composition uncertainty, xs and xg , provide bounds for the model with composition
uncertainty, xms and x
m
g . When debt levels are high, spending-based consolidations in
the model with composition uncertainty, xmg , significantly outperform the same-sized
consolidations in the xg model. On the other hand, tax-based consolidations in the
model with composition uncertainty, xms , underperform tax increases in the x
s model.
This is due to the expectation spill-over effect, as explained in the analytical model in
Section 2. When economic agents fear that a consolidation is imminent and are
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expecting it to be tax-based, they are relieved to find it to be spending-based. While the
spending cuts do not lead to an immediate increase in output, they significantly reduce
the short-run costs and raise the medium-term to long-term benefits. In this sense, a
spending-based consolidation can be expansionary.
If a tax-based consolidation is never expected, these expectation effects would not
apply and the output multiplier from a spending-based consolidation would always be
negative. In contrast, when there was some possibility that it could be spending-based
but the realised consolidation is tax-based, the output costs rise. As we now discuss, this
ranking could depend on the monetary policy stance (via a) and economic agents’
expectations about the composition (via x). These experiments are also informative
about the likelihood of observing an expansionary fiscal consolidation as part of
ongoing fiscal adjustments in developed economies, as the conclusion addresses.
7.2. Less Active Monetary Policy
In Figure 9, deflationary spending cuts facilitate relaxing monetary policy, which
stabilises debt through its impact on the tax base and debt service costs. But when
facing the higher inflation generated by tax-based consolidations, monetary policy
raises the interest rates on government debt, which is particularly destabilising when
debt levels are high. This reasoning suggests that the responsiveness of monetary policy
to inflation is critical in determining the relative efficacy of the alternative types of
fiscal consolidation.
If the initial probability of fiscal consolidation is 0.75, Figure 11 shows the impulse
responses for the two types of fiscal consolidation when monetary policy is less active
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Fig. 10. Output Multipliers with Uncertain Composition
Notes. State-dependent consolidations, xi , and state-dependent consolidations with composition
uncertainty, xmi , for i = τ, g, under different initial probabilities of consolidation.
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(a = 1.2). Comparing to the benchmark (a = 1.5) in Figure 9, a less active monetary
policy deepens the recession under spending-based consolidations, reducing its ability
to stabilise debt. Tax-based consolidations, though, are no longer thwarted by
monetary policy: there is a more pronounced decline in debt following the tax-based
consolidation. Nevertheless, spending-based consolidations remain relatively more
effective in reducing the debt burden and this relative efficacy at high debt levels is
likely to exist as long as monetary policy is active.17
Figure 12 plots the multipliers under the less active monetary policy. Tax increases
become more expansionary, as the output multiplier turns positive upon the exit of
fiscal consolidation, while spending cuts become more contractionary. In an
environment when nominal interest rates are close to, or at, the zero lower bound,
we are far more likely to observe economic expansions following tax-based rather than
spending-based consolidations.
7.3. Lower Probability of Tax-based Consolidation
In our final experiment, we return to our benchmark monetary policy of a = 1.5, but
reverse the relative likelihood of tax-based and spending-based consolidations by
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17 Giavazzi and Pagano’s (1990) case studies of Ireland and Denmark suggest, consistent with our
mechanism, that there was a significant fall in inflation in the expansionary consolidations considered, which
was not the case in the initial unsuccessful consolidation undertaken in Ireland.
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setting x = 0.25. Spending cuts are now three-times more likely than tax increases.
This reversal makes negligible difference at low-debt levels since neither kind of
consolidations is expected, but will matter at high-debt levels.
Figure 13 shows that when the relatively low probability tax-based consolidation is
realised, inflation rises relative to the no-consolidation case and monetary policy raises
real interest rates, reducing the tax base and fuelling debt service costs. Government
debt rises relative to the no-consolidation case, undermining the stabilising effects in
Figure 9. Spending-based consolidations remain relatively effective in stabilising debt,
but become less expansionary than those observed in Figure 9.
8. Conclusions
We explored the non-linearities and expectation effects inherent in state-dependent
fiscal consolidations. Three main policy implications emerge. First, quite restrictive
conditions are required to generate expansionary fiscal consolidations in the medium
term: a highly indebted economy operating under an active monetary policy,
unexpectedly undertakes a spending-based fiscal consolidation when economic agents
were confident that consolidations were going to be tax based. The nine large-scale
fiscal consolidations contained in the IMF (2012) suggest that the current consolida-
tion measures are predominantly spending based and that any revisions to consoli-
dation plans have tended to shift the burden even further away from revenue raising
measures, as electorates resist tax increases. The uniformity in the broad composition
of current consolidation efforts negates the first condition for observing an
expansionary fiscal consolidation.
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Second, the possibility of observing ‘expansionary’ fiscal consolidations is driven by
the favourable resolution of uncertainty associated with undesirable types of consol-
idation, either in terms of their composition or timing. Although we do not undertake
a formal welfare analysis, we can conjecture that it is likely to be desirable for
governments to remove such uncertainty as early as possible, since the possibility of
undesirable consolidations acts as a drag on economic activity. As soon as the
uncertainty is removed, however, the realised consolidation contains no new
information, and an expansionary consolidation would not follow. In our model,
‘expansionary’ fiscal consolidations reflect a failure to rule out undesirable policy
options sooner, rather than the adoption of an inherently expansionary policy.
Third, the inflationary consequences of alternative fiscal instruments and the
monetary policy response to the inflation are very important in determining the
outcomes. Tax-based and spending-based consolidations are fundamentally different
in the inflation consequences in a sticky-price economy: distortionary taxation raises
marginal costs and fuels inflation, while spending cuts are typically deflationary. How
these different inflation responses affect debt service costs depends on the monetary
policy response to inflation. Although we do not formally consider policy at the zero
lower bound, that bound is a limiting case of the reduction in monetary policy activism
we do consider. The fact that actual monetary policy is currently constrained at the
zero lower bound means that it is far more difficult for monetary policy to offset the
deflationary effects of a spending-based consolidation. This further decreases the
likelihood of observing an expansionary consolidation.
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Taken together, these points suggest that expansionary fiscal consolidations are
unlikely to accompany ongoing consolidation efforts.
Appendix A. Simulating the Fiscal Limit
The utility function is uðct ;ntÞ ¼ logct þ vN logð1  ntÞ. Assuming the inflation rate is at its
target, labour supply can be solved analytically as a function of ðst ; gtÞ using the first-order
conditions.
nt ¼ wtð1 stÞ þ vngt
wtð1 stÞ þ vnA
;
where wt ¼ ðh  1Þ=hA. The peak of Laffer curve, smaxt , can be solved as,
smaxðgtÞ ¼ 1þ vn
A
wt

ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
vnðwt þ vnAÞðA  gtÞ
p
wt
: ðA:1Þ
The fiscal limit B can be obtained using Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation:
(i) for each simulation, we randomly draw the shocks of government purchases, and
transfers for 1,500 periods. Assuming that the tax rate is always at the peak of the
dynamic Laffer curves, we compute the paths of all other variables using the household
first-order conditions and the budget constraints. According to (41), we compute the
discounted sum of maximum fiscal surplus by discarding the first 500 draws as a burn-in
period.
(ii) we repeat the simulation for 100,000 times and obtain the distribution of the fiscal
limit, which is then approximated through kernel density estimation.
(iii) at each period of time, the effective fiscal limit, bt , is a random draw from the
distribution.
Appendix B. Data
The fiscal data are from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 84 (2009) for the period between
1971 and 2007. The sample includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. The average tax
rate is defined as the ratio of the total tax revenue over GDP, including social security, indirect
and direct taxes. The government purchases are government final consumption of expenditures.
Lump-sum transfers are defined as the sum of social security payments, net capital transfers and
subsidies.
Appendix C. Solving the Non-linear Model
The decision rules for government debt bt ¼ f bðwtÞ, real wage wt ¼ f wðwtÞ and inflation rate
pt ¼ f pðwtÞ; are solved in the following steps:
(i) discretise the state space wt ¼ fbt1; zt ; xt ; xzt g for xi (i = τ, g, m) models, and
wt ¼ fbt1; st ; gt ; zt ; xzt g for si (i = τ,g) model, with grid points of
nb ¼ 26;ns ¼ 17; ng ¼ 11;nz ¼ 11;nx ¼ 9;nxz ¼ 2. Make an initial guess of the
decision rules ðf b0 ; f w0 ; f p0 Þ over the state space.
(ii) at each grid point, solve the model and obtain the updated rule ðf bi ; f wi ; f pi Þ using the
given rule ðf bi1; f wi1; f pi1Þ. Other than the monetary and fiscal policy rules, the
optimisation equations can be summarised:
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1Rt
¼ bEt ucðt þ 1Þ
ucðtÞ
1
ptþ1
; ðC:1Þ
 unðtÞ
ucðtÞ ¼ wtð1 stÞ; ðC:2Þ
ct þ bt
Rt
¼ bt1
pt
þ ð1 stÞðwtnt þ !tÞ þ zt ; ðC:3Þ
ct þ gt ¼ Ant
"
1 /
2
pt
p
 1
 2#
; ðC:4Þ
ð1 hÞ þ hmct ¼ /

pt
p
 1

pt
p
 b/Et ucðt þ 1Þ
ucðtÞ

ptþ1
p
 1

ptþ1
p
ytþ1
yt
: ðC:5Þ
The integrals implied by the expectation terms on the right-hand side are evaluated
using numerical quadratures.
(iii) check convergence of the decision rules. If jf bi  f bi1j or jf wi  f wi1j or jf pi  f pi1j is
above the desired tolerance (set to 1e  7), go back to step 2; otherwise, f bi , f wi and f pi
are the decision rules.
Appendix D. Dynamic Euler equation Accuracy Test
We evaluate the accuracy of numerical solutions using the dynamic Euler equation test proposed
by Den Haan (2010). The idea is to compare a time series for consumption, ct , that is constructed
using the decision rule directly, with an alternative series, ~ct , that is implied by the Euler equation
and the budget constraint.
Take the si model for example. The construction of ct is straightforward:
(i) draw shocks on st , gt and xzt for T periods: e
s
t 	Nð0; r2sÞ, egt 	Nð0; r2g Þ; and uxzt 	 Uð0; 1Þ
with t = 1,…,T.
(ii) at each period t, construct the state variable at period t, wt ¼ fbt1; st ; gt ; zt ; xzt g, for the
given shocks ðest ; egt ;uxzt Þ, and the state variable at previous period, wt1.
(iii) then use the decision rules to construct ct ¼ f cðwtÞ for the given state wt , and also
update the endogenous state, bt ¼ f bðwtÞ.
(iv) repeat steps 2 and 3 until t = T.
For comparison, we use the same initial state b0 and shocks est ; e
g
t ;u
xz
t ðt ¼ 1; . . . ;T Þ to
construct ~ct :
(i) ~b0 ¼ b0, ~z0 ¼ z0.
(ii) at each period t, construct the state variable at period t, ~wt ¼ f~bt1;~st ; ~gt ; ~zt ; ~xzt g, for the
given shocks ðest ; egt ;uxzt Þ, and the state variable at previous period, ~wt1.
(iii) use the decision rules to construct some temporary variables, b^t , R^t and p^t ,
b^t ¼ f bð~wtÞ R^t ¼ f R ð~wtÞ p^t ¼ f pð~wtÞ: ðD:1Þ
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(iv) also use the decision rule to construct c^tþ1 for possible realisations for estþ1; e
g
tþ1;u
xz
tþ1,
c^tþ1 ¼ f cð~wtþ1Þ:
(v) then compute the consumption ~ct using the Euler equation,
1
~ct
¼ bEt 1
c^tþ1
R^t
p^t
: ðD:2Þ
(vi) use ~ct and the government budget constraint to construct ~bt ,
~bt ¼ R^t
"
~bt1
p^t
þ ~gt þ ~zt  ~stð~gt þ ~ctÞ
#
: ðD:3Þ
(vii) go back to steps 2 and continue until t = T.
The xi models follow the similar procedure, except the state space is wt ¼
n
bt1; zt ; xt ; xzt
o
.
The dynamic Euler equation error is then given by.
100
ct  ~ct
ct

; ðD:4Þ
and Table 3 reports the test results for all scenarios with T = 500. The errors, even the maximum
errors, are low. For instance, the mean error for xs case is 0.015%, implying that households
make a 1.5 cent mistake for each $100 dollars spent. It is interesting to observe that the
endogenous regime-switching cases xi (i = τ,g,m) feature larger errors than the i.i.d. shock case si
(i = τ, g), even though xi has one fewer state variables than si .
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